Friday, February 22, 2013

What is God's Relationship to Time?: A Case for Divine Everlastingness

It's About Time: God's Clock
Does God hold time like this? Or is it a digital clock instead? (Picture source:
An Eternal Question?
Philosophers have disagreed for centuries over God’s relationship to time. I will examine three different answers to this question. I will show that the best position is Everlastingism, viz., that God has always been temporal. This question is important for developing coherent theology,[1] and the matter of God’s relationship to time has entailments for his relationship to creation. As Alan Padgett has said, thoughtful believers should aim for “some kind of coherent understanding of even such remote issues…” as this one.[2] To establish that there is better evidence for Everlastingism than Eternalism, I will use philosophical theology as well as biblical theology.
            My approach shall be to examine the evidence for and against Eternalism, an then the evidence for and against Everlastingism. Along the way, I will also discuss other views that intersect with these two.[3] I will show that the best and largest quantity of properly-interpreted evidence leads to the conclusion that God is temporally everlasting.
Definitions and Delimitations
I will focus on two of the four definitions of time in Garrett DeWeese’s God and the Nature of Time, viz. physical time and metaphysical time.
Physical time is “clock time,”[4] observed in “the succession of states of affairs, both in the physical world around us, and in our own interior mental lives.”[5] Its measurement is relative to one’s “local reference frame.”[6] Physical time began when created objects began.
If God experiences time, however, “God’s time would be metaphysical rather than physical.”[7] Physical time requires change. However, “duration can occur without change,”[8] and duration sans change is only possible with metaphysical time. DeWeese makes the point explicit, saying, “If it turns out that God experiences succession in his being, then metaphysical time would be equivalent to God’s time.”[9] Metaphysical time could have existed before creation. If so, then God experienced succession in his live preceding the moment of creation. It is important to keep the two kinds of time separate.[10]
            God, if timeless, he exists outside time, which he created.[11] A timeless being experiences life in a moment that, according to Plotinus, is “unextended” and “durationless,”[12] having no temporal extension. All actions God, as timeless, takes are simultaneous[13]. \
            A world in which nothing changes is timeless iff there is no duration. A world in which God exists alone, knowing all timeless truths, is metaphysically temporal if God mentally experiences duration himself.
            DeWeese defines entity T as “temporal… iffdef T possesses an A-property or stands in a B-relation to some other entity.”[14] Further, “a temporal entity is one that has temporal location….”[15] Temporality  entails that the A (or dynamic) theory of time is true: only the present exists. As temporal, God would not be present to the future “in his actual existence.”[16] Instead, “God experiences succession as successive moments of time come into being.[17]
            God, if temporal, experiences sequence in the events of his life. But this is not the same as saying that God’s experience of time is the same as any creature’s experience.
            Temporal beings experience events only in the present. The past no longer exists, and the future has not yet arrived. If God ever performs any actions that are not simultaneous, then God experiences sequence and is temporal. As Craig puts it, “either God existed prior to creation or he did not. Suppose he did. In that case God is temporal, not timeless, since to exist prior to some event is to be in time.”[18]
For and Against Eternalism
            As Christians, it is right to enter the issue through Scripture. But does Scripture speak clearly or conclusively to the matter? James Barr and Craig respond in the negative and suggest that God’s relationship to time must be discerned in philosophical, rather than biblical theology.[19] I submit that biblical theology should be taken as far as it can go before we abandon it. Below are passages Eternalists bring out in support of their position that God is timeless. Yet analysis will reveal that these passages more adequately support Everlastingism.
Biblical Evidence: Psalm 90:4 and 2 Peter 3:8
            Both these verses compare thousand years to a single day in God’s sight. But is this evidence for the Eternalist view? Nicholas Wolterstorff is unconvinced. He says these verses, “are probably just making the point that to an everlasting being, finite intervals of time are a matter of indifference.” These verses point to God’s omnipotence—he can do in a day what it takes humans a thousand years to accomplish—rather than timelessness. This is a far cry from saying that God is entirely outside time. An apt metaphor would be this: Once when I was four years old, I waited fifteen minutes for my mother to return books to the library. Those fifteen minutes seemed like an eternity to me. Now, fifteen minutes is a much smaller interval in proportion to my lifetime, and seems to pass by much more quickly. Saying that fifteen minutes for Joel passes by like a single minute for a preschooler is a far cry from saying that Joel exists outside time(!), and these verses are similarly not saying that God does.
Other so-called Eternalist passages
            Psalm 90:2 – God existed “before the mountains came into existence” (NET). This is plainly temporal language; I believe it speaks for itself.
Genesis 1:1; John 1:3 – These discuss “the beginning,” but Craig points out that “Grudem fails to give any argument why such passages should be taken to refer to the beginning of time rather than to the beginning of the world.”[20]
Exodus 3:14; John 8:58 – God’s name is “I am,” but, as Craig asks, why should this be indicative of “eternal presentness in the sense of atemporal existence rather than…one whose existence is characterized by ever-present being in the sense of everlasting duration…”?[21]
Eternalism unsupported by Scripture
            The passages Grudem and other Eternalists offer as evidence for their view just do not support Eternalism on a plain reading, but actually support Everlastingism.[22] Wolterstorff’s hermeneutic is instructive: in literature, think of the author as speaking literally unless you have a good reason not to do so.[23] This prevents “everything from being up for grabs” in terms of interpretation.[24] Taken at face value then, the best Eternalist passages support Everlastingism.
            Grudem’s suggestion that the timeless God acts within time is no solution. Grudem cites Galatians 4:4-5, which talks about God sending his own Son “when the time had fully come.” [25] Grudem is trying to reconcile his position with the record of God’s acting within history. However, as Craig points out, “Grudem advocates a doctrine of divine eternity for which he has provided neither adequate biblical nor philosophical warrant.”[26]
            God as timeless would experience his whole life in a single, timeless instant.[27] It stands to reason that God would experience things the way they actually are, so all of history would actually be timeless. God’s actions in “history” would be effects of a single, all-encompassing action executed in the timeless instant in which God exists. If God were timeless, then so would be everything else, and God acting in history is not possible. After all, what history?
            Moreover, what about the beginning of history? Christian doctrine teaches that God created the world from nothing.  Space prohibits going into much detail here, but Craig shows that, on Eternalism, the cosmos co-exist eternally with God. If creatio ex nihilo is true, however, then there was a moment at which the cosmos began to exist, and time is dynamic.[28]
            It is also worth noting that creatio ex nihilo entails a relational change for God with respect to creation. The cosmos did not change at the moment of creation; since they did not exist before that moment, how could they be said to change? Therefore the moment of creation entails a relational change for God. Any change in relational properties, are “just as temporalizing as changes in a thing’s intrinsic properties.” Any relational change “requires time in order to occur….”[29] So if God is timeless, a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is not true.
             The burden of proof is on the Eternalist, since the biblical passages which speak to God’s relationship to time have to be “de-timized.”[30] Other passages offered by Eternalists suffer the same condition of needing Eternalism read into them. The plain conclusion seems to be that Eternalism just is not immediately available from a prima facie reading of Scripture.
            Eternalism seems to be an obscure view superimposed on Scripture. Paul Helm agrees: “…the idea of timeless eternity is obscure and not fully graspable, but there is nothing novel in the introduction of a [new] concept…to make sense of data otherwise unaccountable.”[31]
But is the data really unaccountable? It seems to me that the only reason to maintain that it is that Helm presupposes Eternalism, which the scriptural data just does not support. Yet many endorse Eternalism because they believe it paints a more acceptable theological portrait of God. John Delmas Lewis contradicts this, saying that, “the claim that God is eternal” is not “logically compatible with the essential tenets of Christian theology,” and there is no “reason to accept the view of time presupposed by the doctrine of divine eternality.”[32]
            Perhaps philosophical theology can succeed where biblical theology falls short? For example, one argument put forward by Eternalists like Brian Leftow is that God as temporal has a fuller existence—free from the loss that comes from the passage of time.  If God, “lives all His life at once… the joy of a timeless God would suffer no tinge of loss.”[33] Leftow says this would be joy of the “most perfect sort.”[34] But would such a life really be more joyful?
            Leftow and other Eternalists overlook the Doctrine of Redemption central to Christian faith. Think of the immeasurable joy God—and his creatures—experience from the abolition of death and sin as a result of the atonement of sin through Christ’s sacrifice.
            Craig says that, on the B-theory of time, all events “exist timelessly in God’s eternal reference frame…”,  entailing that “none of them can exist earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than another event, for these are temporal relations. Thus, in God’s reference frame, all He is confronted with is a chaos of point-events all temporally unrelated to one another.” [35] This precludes real transformation in human life: no new life in Christ, no change in status from object of wrath to object of grace. Those condemned to hell have a presence there that is equally real as their existence as innocent infants. Further, Christ would be eternally crucified!
            An existence in which sin and depravity, not to mention the death of his Son, are ever present to God really cannot be said to be more joyful than an existence in which sin is done away with in real time and Christ is everlastingly resurrected.[36]
            Then there is Scripture’s of the afterlife.[37] Since we will then “know even as [we are] known” (1 Cor. 13:12), we will see time as it really is. If the time is static, however, then we will experience all time in a single, non-durative time “slice.” It is extremely difficult to see just how this could be any more full or enjoyable than a life of everlasting communion with God.
For Everlastingism
            Lewis’ definition of Everlastingism is helpful: This position says that “…God is ‘in’ time, i.e. that the life of God has beginningless and endless temporal duration and is therefore extended indefinitely backwards and forwards in time.”[38]
            I have shown that there is no good reason to read Eternalism into the aforementioned Scripture passages. But there is yet more scriptural evidence for Everlastingism.
The High Priestly Prayer
            Take Jesus’ extended prayer in John 17. In Verse 5, regard that Jesus asks to be glorified, and that he had previously enjoyed glory with the Father. Jesus mentions temporal location: before the world began. This is a clear sign of temporality before creation.
            Jesus’ prayer hearkens back to John 1, when Jesus was with God in the beginning (1:1). In 1:3, John says all things that were made were created by him at the beginning of the world. If there were anything that was uncreated, it would not have come into being by Jesus making it. John 1:3 is not saying that all things that exist were created by Jesus (e.g. God, abstract objects), but rather that all contingent things were created by Jesus. So is time a contingent thing?        Recall that Jesus describes being glorified with the Father before the creation of the world. If time were one of the things created at the creation of the world, then there could be no temporal location sans the world. Yet Jesus refers to a moment before creation. Jesus apparently experienced time before creation. Therefore time is not a created thing. God the Son, had temporal location before the creation of the world, and it seems that the Father did as well. God is therefore temporal.
The Incarnation and interaction with creation
            The Incarnation is God’s best picture of what his life and character are like.[39] Prima facie, the Incarnation presents a God who experiences sequence in his life.[40] Whether God is essentially timeless or temporal, all three persons of the Trinity experience time the same way. Events in Christ’s life may therefore be understood as events in the life of God.[41]
            An Eternalist may say here that, qua man, Christ was temporal, but qua God he is timeless. This “qua move” has shown to be theologically unsatisfactory, entailing a split in God.[42] So Eternalism requires a “split” God or else an illusory Incarnation.
            If God were timeless, then all Christ’s actions would really be made in a single, timeless instant, and the actions and responses of Christ in the Gospels would be illusory. Yet we are presented with a God who really interacts with people, experiencing sequence and duration.[43]
            Other divine interaction, such as intercessory prayer, is also best explained by Everlastingism. Many Christians would testify that they have seen God answer prayer in time, and Scripture presents many examples of this. The Eternalist must explain why these experiences are not veridical, and responses from God are actually entailments of a single, timeless action being worked out.[44]
The entailments of change
            Answered prayer involves change, and any change takes time. God is temporal if he experiences any change. I discussed above why a robust doctrine of creatio ex nihilo argues against Eternalism. Similarly, the creation of new souls argues in favor of Everlastingism. Human procreation just does create new souls. Now, we might say that in some sense God does have a type of relationship with souls, through foreknowledge (Jeremiah 1:5), prior to their conception. However, it does seem necessary that God’s relationship to any soul changes at conception. The change cannot be said to have occurred in the soul itself, which had no previous existence.[45] The change is a relational one for God.[46]  I describe this as follows: (1) If God changes relationally, then God is temporal. (2) Creation of new souls entails relational change for God. (3) New souls are conceived. (4) God changes relationally. (5) Therefore God is temporal.
God’s sovereignty
            In discussing the Everlastingist position with my classmates, I have repeatedly come across this objection: “God being “in time” seems to limit God. Should not God, being omnipotent, be able to travel in and out of time?” Yet this proposal is incoherent. How could God “travel in and out of time?” There is much we could say about such a proposition, but I will leave it at this: changing from timelessness to temporality would involve change. Any change in God entails temporality. Therefore God would be temporal.[47]
            In other words, then one should not reject Everlastingism because one is worried it somehow makes God “bound.” God is no more bound by time than he is “bound” by morality or the rules of logic. The universe is temporal because God is. God is the ground of and explanation for duration and sequence in the cosmos, which is temporal on account of God.
            There is, however, the problem of how God knows the future. This problem is based on an apparently inconsistent triad: (1) An entity may only know the information he directly experiences; (2) God does not directly experience the future; (3) God knows the future. Of course, this triad is only inconsistent if all three of the propositions are true. We could deny (3), but that would sacrifice omniscience. We could deny (2), but that would entail the B-theory of time and run us into scriptural problems (discussed above). The clear solution is to deny (1); there does not seem to be any reason why God must experience the future in order to know it. Molinism is one solution put forward  to explain how God can know the future, and many consider it to be an “ingenious solution.”[48]
God’s freedom
            There is an argument put forward by proponents of the position that God is timeless (including Craig’s view that God is timeless sans creation) that says this: in order for God to take any action, he must have a sufficient reason for doing so. If God was temporal before creation, then he must have had a good reason for creating the world at the exact moment he did, i.e. at T instead of T-1 or T+1, etc. Since any moment before creation would have been indistinguishable from any other moment, there cannot seem to be any such reason. Therefore, the Everlastingist view is seen to be lacking in explanatory scope. Yet this objection is easily overcome.
            As Wolterstorff explains, one need not have a sufficient reason for taking certain actions. As an example, take the action of getting out of bed on a Saturday. Wolterstorff says, “No doubt I have a reason for deciding to get out of bed; but do I also have a reason for deciding to get out at just that moment, rather than earlier or later?”[49] Similarly, God needs no such sufficient reason to create. He just does create when he decides to create. Yandell contributes that, given two mutually exclusive options that are equally good, one is not guilty for choosing one rather than the other. If God is temporal, then choosing to create the cosmos at T1 rather than T2 is no more rational or irrational than if he had chosen to create the world at T2, T3, or any other time.[50]
Could God have been timeless sans creation?
            Craig’s position is that God is currently temporal, but is timeless sans creation. In his timeless state God had the ability to become temporal, but chose not to exercise it “until” the moment of creation. However, Padgett has shown that, if it is possible for God to change (e.g. become temporal), then it is necessary that he be (at least in some sense) already temporal.[51] A summary of his syllogism is, (1) No change happens outside of time, and (2) actualized change or the possibility of change or necessitate duration. So if God was potentially temporal sans creation, then God just was temporal before creation.
Against Everlastingism
            The best argument of which I am aware in opposition to Everlastingism is the problem of an infinite regress of past events. Craig has repeatedly put forward the seeming impossibility of an actual infinite existing.[52] Further, the idea that some entity had existed for an infinite number of moments up to the present seems inconceivable. This is indeed a daunting objection, but it is not insurmountable. God’s everlasting existence in the past can be put like this: (1) For any moment T, God exists at T. (2) For any moment T, God existed at T-1.The objection to an infinite regress being moved out of the way, there just does not seem to be good reason to complicate the temporal model with timelessness at all.

            Certainly, this paper is not exhaustive. However, we have seen enough relevant evidence to reach a conclusion. The best and largest quantity of evidence points toward God being everlasting in his existence.  There are significant entailments of this conclusion: First, God hears our prayers, and actually responds to us. Second, the record of Scripture, which portrays the Lord meeting with his people, forgiving them, punishing them, and eventually becoming incarnate and dying for them, is reliable. God’s omniscience is also preserved.[53]
            The Eternalist view also has its entailments. It entails a God who knows all timeless facts, but never thinks about them, never ponders them, never decides, regrets, or is grieved. Scripture’s witness must be “de-timized” and timelessness read into it, rather than being able to be taken at face value. It is a happy thing for us that the evidence points the other way.
            So then, God is from everlasting to everlasting. Time “is… not a merely created category but characterizes the very life of God.”[54] The universe is temporal because God is, and experiences duration because God does. The everlasting God hears our prayers, preserves us, and transforms us in real time. Through the once-for-all atoning sacrifice of his only begotten Son in the past, God saves and sanctifies us in the present, preparing us for a glorious and everlasting future with him.

[1] Alan G. Padgett, “Response to William Lane Craig,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 166.
[2] Padgett, “Response to William Lane Craig,” 167.
[3] Primarily, I will discuss William Lane Craig’s view of Divine Timelessness and Omnitemporality. This position did not merit a whole section because it only differs from my conclusion on a couple of points, which I address below. So far as I know, Craig is the only one to hold this position. I am indebted here to Keith Yandell for his lecture on this topic as part of the “Theism” class at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School on January 11-12, 2012.
[4] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 9.
[5] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 9.
[6] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 9.
[7] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 245.
[8] Padgett, “Response to William Lane Craig,” 168 (emphasis mine).
[9] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 10.
[10] William Lane Craig has pointed out that such a “simplistic” convolution leads to incoherent conclusions in the work of theologian Wayne Grudem. Cf. William Lane Craig, “A Critique of Grudem’s Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of Divine Eternity,” Reasonable Faith, accessed 10 January, 2013,
[11] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 112.
[12] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 131.
[13] I realize that this is not technically correct, since simultaneous events occur at the same time, and, if they occur eternally, then the events in God’s life cannot even be said to occur at any time. However, because of the lack of adequate language for talking about timelessness, it becomes (paradoxically) necessary to speak of eternity using  words better suited for talking about temporality..
[14] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 244.
[15] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 245.
[16] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 206.
[17] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 206.
[18] William Lane Craig, “Divine Timelessness & Omnitemporality,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 140 (emphasis in original).
[19] James Barr, Biblical Words for Time (London: SCM Press, 1962), 80, quoted in William Lane Craig, “God, Time and Eternity, Reasonable Faith, accessed 21 January, 2013,
[20] Craig, “A Critique of Grudem’s Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of Divine Eternity.”
[21] Craig, “A Critique of Grudem’s Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of Divine Eternity.”
[22] Craig, “A Critique of Grudem’s Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of Divine Eternity.”
[23] Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Response to Critics,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 227
[24] Wolterstorff, “Response to Critics,” 228.
[25] Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 172.
[26] Craig, “A Critique of Grudem’s Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of Divine Eternity.”
[27] I use the temporal term “instant” to describe how God as timeless would experience life because I just do not know a good way to speak of an entity existing outside of time without using temporal language.
[28] William Lane Craig, Time and Eternity (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001), 210.
[29] Craig, “A Critique of Grudem’s Formulation and Defense of the Doctrine of Divine Eternity.”
[30] I am indebted to Dr. Keith Yandell for his constructive insights on a brief of this paper’s main points (Keith Yandell, e-mail message to author, January 19, 2013). Citations of these insights will appear as “Insights.”
[31] Paul Helm, Eternal God: A Study of God without Time (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 23.
[32] John Delmas Lewis III, God and Time: The Concept of  Eternity and the Reality of Tense (Madison: University Microfilms International, 1985), 2.
[33] Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 279.
[34] Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), 279.
[35] Craig, Time and Eternity, 96.
[36] Cf. Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Unqualified Divine Temporality,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 187-213.
[37] Cf. Hugh Ross, “Time and the Physics of Sin,” in What God Knows: Time and the Question of Divine Knowledge, ed. Henry Lee Poe and J. Stanley Mattson (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2005), 136, cf. 121.
[38] Lewis, God and Time: The Concept of  Eternity and the Reality of Tense, 1.
[39] cf. Colossians 1:15
[40] Richard A. Holland, Jr., God, Time, and the Incarnation (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2012), 68.
[41] Cf. Holland, God, Time and Incarnation.
[42] Cf. Holland, God, Time and Incarnation.
[43] However, as Keith Yandell has pointed out, with all the entailments that come with God being temporal, it is highly questionable whether a quality such as temporality can be anything other than an essential one. I am indebted to Dr. Keith Yandell for his constructive insights on a brief of this paper’s main points (Keith Yandell, e-mail message to author, January 19, 2013). Citations of these insights will appear as “Insights.”
[44] Cf. DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 265.
[45] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 271.
[46] Padgett, “Relative Timelessness,” 109.
[47] Further, once outside time, would God experience all his existence in a single “time slice,” including the portions of his life during which he was temporal? And what would his people do during those moments, or perhaps days or even millennia, during which God had gone “outside” time? Would he stop hearing and answering prayers during those periods? Or would he answer them all in a timeless moment without duration? And then, how could he restrict himself to answering only those prayers which were asked during the “time” he spent as timeless? The mind boggles. I cannot see how such a theory would do anything to answer the question of God’s relationship to time.
[48] DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 207.
[49] Wolterstorff, “Response to William Lane Craig,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 172 (emphasis his).
[50] Yandell, “Insights.”
[51] Padgett, “Response to William Lane Craig,” 168.
[52] William Lane Craig, “Q&A with William Lane Craig #12: Forming an Actual Infinite by Successive Addition,” Reasonable Faith, accessed 18 January, 2013,
[53] I addressed God’s tensed knowledge in a previous version of this paper, but omitted it for space concerns. For more, see: Lewis, God and Time: The Concept of  Eternity and the Reality of Tense, 3-4.
[54] Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Response to Alan G. Padgett,” in God and Time: Four Views, ed. Gregory E. Ganssle (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 123. 


  1. I am amazed when I come to blogs (atheist, religious or otherwise) where there are consistently long posts and no comments. Actually it is the "no comments" part that amazes me and I wonder is it because:
    1. the guy does not know how to engage dialogue
    2. is boring
    3. doesn't listent to others
    4. writes to the wrong audience
    5. doesn't know how to advertise
    6. is categorically confused
    7. has obvious psychological issues people avoid

    But if I find a blog with no comments -- I typically will not read a single word. Thus, my advice (should you care) if you want to be heard and engaged: figure out how to get people engaged in your posts (looking for hints from the above).

  2. Interesting point. Thanks for commenting! Feel free to offer any tips.

  3. I did offer tips -- 7 of them. Do some introspection and see if any apply.
    But for # 8 I would add == be prompt in answering comments. This reply took a week.
    Also, in the comment say, @ Sabio: ....
    That way when it comes in an e-mail, the person knows to come back and respond.

    And finally, visit other folk's blogs -- for instance, clicking on my link would lead to mine.

    The tips are simple

  4. @Sabio: Tips=advice, action steps, etc. Also, this is a very part-time gig, which I do when I'm not working in ministry and/or taking care of my pregnant wife and toddler! Thanks again for weighing in.

  5. This comment has been removed by the author.

  6. @ Joel,
    Most bloggers are part-time and busy, my friend. I hope my action steps were clear enough for you. Good luck with the family and the work.

  7. Thank you for the time and effort you spent in researching this topic. Your explanation is helpful in answering the God-time question. Again, thank you.